Who would have guessed that how we appoint a financial watchdog, the guardian of the public purse in B.C., would become such a political issue?
Premier Christy Clark has promised legislation to address the recent political controversy surrounding John Doyle and the legislative committee charged with the process of recommending an auditor general to the legislative assembly.
The immediate intent is to manage the public criticisms triggered by the decision of Liberal MLAs who rejected a second term for the incumbent, John Doyle. What became patently obvious in recent weeks, Clark stated just the other day. That is, that British Columbians “need to have confidence that the right person is being selected for the right reasons and that the process stands untainted by political agendas.” The premier has made it clear that she would like to see Doyle offered an extended term.
To do this, the statute governing the provincial office of the auditor general needs to be amended.
If, however, the legislation is only about extending the term of the B.C. auditor general from six to eight years and limiting a specific appointment to one term only, then a unique opportunity to improve the overall process of appointing an auditor general will be missed.
Flaws in the current process are about excessive secrecy and possible apprehensions of bias surrounding the chair of the committee.
These could be fixed and perhaps even prevented in the future without the need to amend legislation.
What any legislative reform on this issue should also consider is the question: How should we appoint a legislative officer like the auditor general? Who ought to have a voice in the process? Who should have the decision-making authority and in accordance with what form of endorsement?
In recommending and approving the appointment of an auditor general, practices vary across the country, suggesting a range of possible choices for B.C. to bear in mind and to openly discuss before rushing through a bill for the purposes of what has been called short-term damage control.
In some Canadian jurisdictions, the process is centred very much in the cabinet and first minister’s office; in some of these cases, such as Ontario and Saskatchewan, it involves consultation with the chair of the relevant standing committee of the legislature.
In a few provinces, the recommendation for an auditor general similarly comes from the executive council (cabinet) but then must go to the legislative assembly for a formal vote for approval. In Nova Scotia, for example, the vote is a simple majority of the members. In Quebec, the motion presented by the premier must receive the support of at least two-thirds of the members of the national assembly.
In Alberta, the process is perhaps closest to what B.C. has, and what Clark is proposing on an eight-year term, although with a few important differences.
One difference is that in Alberta, the auditor general is eligible for reappointment for a second eight-year term. Clark’s proposal would rule out such an option.
The second and more significant difference is that in Alberta, the auditor general is appointed by the provincial cabinet on the recommendation of a select standing committee of the legislative assembly. That recommendation is not required by law to be unanimous, reflecting something of the decision processes of some other provinces.
B.C. is the only jurisdiction in Canada that has a legislative requirement stipulating that the resolution of the committee of the legislative assembly must be a unanimous recommendation.
In a parliamentary system with strict party discipline and adversarial politics, and a committee process shrouded in confidentiality, this rule of unanimity for a small group of MLAs is a recipe for breeding public skepticism and reinforcing partisan agendas.
Politics, of course, should not and cannot be removed from this process of appointing or renewing a high-profile legislative officer who, in our imperfect system of responsible government, serves a fundamental role in the public accountability of government actions and inactions, budget decisions and public servants.
But, certainly, we can do better in improving this process beyond just extending an olive branch to the incumbent auditor general, to ask him to please stay on for two more years and then go quietly.
Michael J. Prince is Lansdowne Professor of Social Policy at the University of Victoria and co-author of Canadian Public Budgeting in the Age of Crises, to be published this spring by McGill-Queen’s University Press.
