Many of the analyses that have emerged as a result of the United Kingdom’s referendum to remain in or to leave the European Union have dubbed the Brexit win a triumph of the people against the elites. The main spokespersons of the “leave” camp, Nigel Farage for instance, based their campaign on the claim that they were siding with the people against the cosmopolitan elite.
“Brexiters,” however, were led by what could arguably be called the political, economic, and cultural elite of the country. Think of Boris Johnson, for instance, the former mayor of London who holds a degree from Oxford, or of Michael Gove, who also studied at Oxford and is lord chancellor and secretary of state for justice, or of Farage, who was formerly a broker in the City and is currently a member of the European parliament and member of the famous private East India Club, to name a few.
Besides the biographical details of the main “leave” camp representatives, the victory of the people against the elites also does not seem to take into account several key socio-economic factors.
From a simplistic point of view, the “people against the elite” perspective might suggest that the people represent only 52 per cent of the population and that the greatly loathed elite represent 48 per cent of the population (not to mention the 28 per cent of registered voters who did not exercise their right to vote in the referendum).
Shown this way, the concept of elite versus people seems ambiguous, as the leading class could not possibly represent 48 per cent of the population. Furthermore, using the people-against-the-elite theory to describe the Brexit victory does not account for important generational, birthplace, regional and educational divisions.
The first schism between the electorate is generational: Voters younger than 50 largely voted to stay in the EU (75 per cent of 18-24 year olds and 56 per cent of 25-49 year olds), while older voters opted for Brexit (56 per cent of 50-64 year olds and 61 per cent of those aged 65 and older).
As can be expected, a majority of citizens who immigrated voted to stay in the EU. Of the United Kingdom’s 382 localities, dozens are made up of more than 30 per cent of citizens born outside of the country. Only four of these areas voted for the “leave” camp (Luton, Hillingdon, Barking and Dagenham, and Slough).
The third division is geographic. Regions in the east, the Midlands and Wales (ironically, a major recipient of EU development funds) largely favoured an exit from the EU, while others, including Scotland, Northern Ireland, and big cities such as London, Manchester and Liverpool, voted to maintain the status quo.
Finally, education levels indicate a fourth division in the electorate. Those holding a secondary-school education voted in great part to leave (66 per cent) while those with a university education mainly voted to stay in the EU (71 per cent).
This brief statistical analysis shows that several important divisions exist between the different types of voters. However, none of these allow for a clear division between the “people” and the “elite.” Using these data, the presupposed “elite” might be defined as those who are young, born outside of the country, live in specific regions and hold a university degree.
Rather than coining Brexit a victory of the people against the elite, it would be fair to say that the results of the election indicated a victory of anti-elitist and populist sentiment. It was a victory of the inflammatory discourse that attempts to separate and manipulate crowds, telling them that they do not belong to the elite and therefore must think differently from the elite.
This type of discourse is far from the courageous political debate that attempts to convince the electorate, using careful reflection and argumentation; that certain opinions are rooted in reason and vie for the public interest.
Ironically, Brexit’s anti-elitist discourse was upheld by the populist elite that named themselves spokespersons of public opinion. Public debates on this issue were blocked by tactics to leverage an opposition between an imaginary people and a hated elite, rather than fuelled by a discussion on ideas and ideology.
Rather than debate, the intention of these spokespersons was to divide and as a result, democracy suffered.
Philippe Bernier Arcand is author of Le Parti québécois: d’un nationalisme à l’autre. Olivier Choinière is a course lecturer at l’École nationale d’administration publique in Quebec City.
