If you’re a skeptic when it comes to Canadian government defence-policy statements, you probably didn’t pay much, if any, attention to the latest announcement. If you’re an optimist, and there aren’t that many left, then the old saying “hope springs eternal” might have come to mind.
And why not, especially when Minister of Foreign Affairs Chrystia Freeland gave a stirring foreign-policy speech in the House of Commons, the day before the new Strong, Secure, Engaged defence policy was released.
Of course, back in 2005, Paul Martin’s government issued its own energetic, but short-lived International Policy Statement, A Role of Pride and Influence in the World, with Bill Graham’s accompanying defence section. Stephen Harper’s government followed with its own spirited Canada First Defence Strategy in 2008.
Harper’s ambitious defence plan, however, was no match for the $55.6-billion federal deficit in 2009-2010 and the $33.4-billion shortfall that came after. As a result, much in Canada’s defence world came to a grinding halt.
More recently, the government’s long-term economic and fiscal projections also had little to offer in the way of encouragement, with deficits forecast for at least the next 35 years. Now that defence spending is set to grow, one can only assume our annual deficits will get bigger and bigger.
Amid all the fanfare surrounding the release of our latest defence policy, it’s probably safe to say that some in Ottawa had their fingers tightly crossed that folks wouldn’t take the time to revisit the old one, and certainly not the one before that. Not to be too unkind, because there is little latitude when it comes to defence policy-making in Canada, but the similarities to the Martin and Harper defence policies are clearly there.
For example, “troop to task” numbers set out in the new defence policy, not unsurprisingly because Bill Graham was a member of the defence minister’s advisory panel, are similar to those found in his 2005 defence plan. The 2008 Harper strategy predicted the defence budget would reach $30 billion in 2027-28. There was also a promise to invest $490 billion in defence over 20 years, grow the regular force to 70,000, the reserves to 30,000 and the civilian workforce to 25,000.
The new policy, nine years on, promises a defence budget of $32.7 billion in 2026-27, and $553 billion over 20 years. As for the personnel numbers, everything is the same, except the new policy adds another 1,500 personnel to the regular force.
However, when it comes to peace operations, the UN is front and centre. In the Harper plan, the UN was mentioned just once, in passing. Then again, we have been waiting since August of last year to know where the government will send as many as 600 Canadian blue berets. Perhaps now that the defence policy is out, we’ll hear more.
And then there’s the United States. In April, Canada’s Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence warned that Ottawa was not doing enough and “relying entirely on the Americans to provide for our defence,” as Senator Colin Kenny said. Clearly, someone got the “client state” message. As it stands, we know that Canada’s defence plan has been well-received in Washington, which expects Canada to be there when needed.
At the end of the day, however, one can’t help wondering if the new defence policy will survive for long. What happens when the bills start coming in? Will the new defence policy end up becoming nothing more than a footnote in some graduate student’s thesis on Canadian defence policy, much like Martin and Harper’s? Better yet, will the policy last much beyond U.S. President Donald Trump’s time in office?
That’s probably the best question to ask.
Chris Kilford of Victoria is a fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy at Queen’s University.
